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EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENT AFFECTING THE
NATIONAL PARKS: PRESERVING "THE
BEST IDEA WE EVER HAD"
A short course sponsored by the
Natural Resources Law Center





Many of our national parks are surrounded by
federal and state public lands that are managed under
principles much different from those governing the
parks. While the National Parks Organic Act mandates
preservation of park resources, most other public land
management agencies operate under multiple use
statutes authorizing resource consumption and
development. Planning statutes, such as NEPA and NFMA,
may require some consideration of park interests when
federal agencies undertake development activities on
nearby lands, but they do not require deference to the
parks. Resource protection legislation, such as the
Endangered Species Act and the Wilderness Act, may
protect some shared wildlife species and bordering
lands and thus afford protection to an adjacent park,
but these statutes are only helpful to the parks when
the designated resource is present. Other federal and
state statutes regulating land use and resource
development activites, as well as certain common law
doctrines, may also impose some limitations on the
actions of the national parks' public neighbors. None
of these statutes, however, specifically addresses the
question of park protection. Thus, despite the Organic
Act's preservation mandate, the national parks are not
securely protected against threatening activities
occurring on adjacent public lands.
B. Selected References
1. Comment, Protecting National Parks From
Developments Beyond Their Borders, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1189 (1984).
2. Keiter, On Protecting the National Parks From the
External Threats Dilemma, 20 Land & Water L. Rev. 355
(1985).
3. Hiscock, Protecting National Park System Buffer
Zones: Existing, Pro posed, and Suggested Authority, 7
J. of Energy Law & Policy 35 (1986).
4. The Conservation Foundation, NATIONAL PARKS FOR A
NEW GENERATION 141-154 (1985).
II. National Parks Legislation
A. The Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. §1- 460 hh-6.
The Organic Act provides that the fundamental
purpose of the national parks is to conserve the parks'
scenery, and natural and historic objects, and
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wildlife, while providing for public use in a manner
that will leave the parks "unimpaired for the enjoyment
of future generations." 16 U.S.C. §1. No court has yet
directly addressed the question of how the inherent
conflict between the statute's preservation and use
mandates is to be resolved. Because the Act's public
use provision is qualified by such strong preservation
language, it has been forcefully argued that the parks
should he administered to protect their natural
resources, even if this means limiting public use
opportunities. Lemons h. Stout, A Reinterpretation of
National Park Legislation, 15 Env. Law 41 (1984).
See also J. Sax, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS:
REFLECTIONS ON THE NATIONAL PARKS 79-90 (1980).
B. The Section la-1 Amendment
In 1978 Congress amended the Organic Act to
provide that "the protection, management and
administration of those areas [national parks] shall he
conducted in light of the high public value and
integrity of the National Park System and shall not he
exercised in derogation of the values and purposes for
which these various areas have been established..." 16
U.S.C. §18-1. The courts have ruled that the amendment
imposes a responsibility on the Secretary of Interior
to protect park resources from threatening activities.
Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980);
nirgiiirflane Ass n. v. Potter, 62A F. SupP. 903, 910
(D.D.C. 19b5). According to the courts, the Secretary
has considerable discretion in determining now to
discharge his §1a-1 responsibility, and he will only he
held accountable if he acts unreasonably. Sierra Club
v. Andrus, id. Cf. Clark v. Community for Creative Non
Violence, 104 gr— Ct. 306-5 (1984) (holding that the
Judiciary does not have "tne authority to replace the
Park Service as the manager of the Nation's parks or
... the competence to judge how much protection of park
lands is wise and how that level of conservation is
to be attained.").
Section la-1 does not provide the Park Service
with any authority to regulate developments occurring
on public or other lands outside the parks. Therefore,
the Park Service must rely upon other environmental
statutes as a basis for challenging threatening
external activities. But federal agencies do not
litigate against each other, so this ordinarily means
that these statutes will only he used by the Park
Service to negotiate with sister land management
agencies. Environmentalists and other interested
parties, however, might point to the Secretary's
Section la-1 responsibility and applicable
environmental statutes to challenge the Secretary's
inaction in pursuin g park protection goals. Cf. Sierra
Club v. Andrus, id.
C. The Section la-1 Exceptions Clause
The Section la-1 amendment to the Organic Act
contains an exceptions clause which provides that the
protection and management of the national parks "shall
not he exercised in derogation of the values and
purposes for which the various areas have been
established, except, as may have been or shall be
directly and specifically provided by Congress."
Unless the exceptions clause is narrowly interpreted
(which it might be since it speaks in terms of direct
and specific congressional action), the provision seems
to authorize incompatible multiple use activities on
public lands adjacent to the parks, so long as these
activities are being carried out in accordance with the
federal land management agency's organic legislation.
Cf. Sierra Club v. Watt, 566 F. Supp. 380 (D. Utah
1-783) (citing the §la-1 exceptions clause to sustain
NPS-ALM plans for mining in National Recreation Areas).
This exceptions clause also calls into question whether
the Interior Secretary can rely upon the Organic Act to
promulgate regulations protecting the parks from
threatening activities arising on adjacent federal
lands by limiting the management authority of the
agencies responsible for these lands. Cf.
Free Enterprise Canoe Renters Ass I n. v. Watt, 711 fT7F
852 (8th Cir. 1983); United States  v.177.77552 F. 2d
817 (8th Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 471 U.S. 949 (1977)
(both cases sustain regulations limiting activities on
state or private property within the parks).
D. The Property Power
It is clear that Congress has the power under the
property clause, P.S. Const., art. IV, sec. 3, to
regulate developments on public lands adjacent to the
parks. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 520 (1976). Cf.
Sax, Helpless Giants: The National Parks and the
Regulation of Private Lands, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 239
(1976). Congress therefore has the constitutional
power to adopt legislation such as the recently
proposed Parks Protection Act which would mandate
consultation between the Interior Secretary and other
federal Agencies before these agencies could take
actions that might harm the parks. See H.R. 2379, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); See genern 1 2 , Keiter, 20
Land & Water L. Rev. 355, 396-403 (1985T
E. Park Establishing Statutes
Park protection may also he achieved by amending
the establishing legislation creatin g the individual
units of the national park system. 	 In the case of
Redwood National Park and Grand Canyon National Park,
Congress has recently revised their boundaries in
response to external threats from adjacent lands. See
16 U.S.C. §79b-79q (Redwood) 16 U.S.C. §228-a - 22877
(Grand Canyon). See generally, Hudson, Sierra Club v.
Dept. of the Interior: The Tightto Preserve Redwood
National Park, 7 Ecology L. Q. 781 (1978); Note, The
Grand Canyon Park Enlargement Act: Perspectives on
Protection of a National Resource, 18 Ariz. L.Rev. 232
(1976). Congress has also written protective
provisions limiting adjacent land uses into the
establishing legislation for new park units, but these
provisions have been used s p aringly and they have
been aimed primarily at adjacent state and private
landowners or managers. Seee.g., 16 U.S.C. §459h-
3 (b) (2) (establishing minimum federal znning
requirements at Cape Cod National Seashore that local
governments must meet, otherwise the Secretary may
invoke his eminent domain power to protect the park
against nonconforming property uses).
III. Federal Planning Legislation
A. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §4321-
4370.
NEPA requires federal agencies contemplating
actions "significantly effecting the quality of the
human environment" to prepare an EIS identifying the
environmental impacts of the proposal and alternatives
to the action. 42 U.S.C. §4332(c). Most development
activities pro posed for federal lands bordering
national parks will he covered by NEPA, and the
responsible land management agency will be required to
prepare an EIS, or at least the less rigorous
Environmental Assessment (EA). This will provide
interested parties, including the Park Service, with an
opportunity to comment on the proposal and suggest
alternatives or additional considerations related to
the park's interests. However, the agency responsible
for the proposal is the ultimate decisionmaker, and it
is not hound by NEPA to select the most environmentally
sound alternative.
The CEQ's regulations on NEPA indicate that one
factor to be considered in determining whether land
management agencies must prepare an EIS evaluating the
environmental impact of proposed projects is the
proximity of the project to park lands, historic or
cultural resources, or ecologically critical areas. 40
CFR 1508.27 (b) (3). Thus, park officials' comments on
a project should carry substantial weight with the
managing agency in determining the extent of
environmental analysis required under NEPA. 	 See
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Glacier-Two Medicine Alliance et al., 88 IBLA 133, 141
(1985). Park protectio-r-n advocates can also draw upon
the Park Service's public comments in arguing for full
EIS review of a proposed project.
Several recent court decisions address NEPA issues
involving management decisions on public lands near
national parks, and they therefore have some relation
to park protection concerns. In Sierra Club v.
Peterson, 717 F. 2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. f17817—ttre-715uFF
tirrcirrirt NEPA required the Forest Service to prepare
an EIS, not an EA, in evaluating the environmental
consequences of their decision to issue oil and gas
leases on nonwilderness forest lands where the lease
did not contain a no surface occupancy clause. See also
Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985)
reaching a similar result with respect to leases with a
no surface occupancy stipulation. Conner is currently
under appeal to the Ninth Circuit. In Thomas v.
Peterson, 753 F. 2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985), the court
recognized that cumulative effects analysis was
required under NEPA. The court ruled that the Forest
Service must prepare an EIS analyzing the combined
effect of the potential management actions contemplated
upon completion of the challenged road, including
possible timber sales in the area. 	 See 40 CFR
1508.25(8)(1)(1984).
The CEQ's NEPA regulations recognize the
possibility of an unresolvable interagency conflict
respecting a project proposal, and they provide for a
referral to CFQ for its recommendations. 40 CFR 1504
(1984). Since interagency litigation is not an
alternative available to the Park Service, this
provides the Park Service with a mechanism to escalate
a disagreement with a bordering land management agency.
However, there is an understandable reluctance among
agencies to air their disagreements publicly or to pass
decisionmaking authority (even if only for a
recommendation) to another entity. It is therefore
unlikely that this CEQ referral process represents a
viable alternative for resolving agency disagreements
on park protection issues.
B. National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §1600-
1687.
NFMA mandates forest planning in accordance with
multiple use principles. 16 U.S.C. 0602. See
Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. §528-5M.
But the Act requires that the Forest Service utilize
NEPA procedures in developing its forest plans. l6
U.S.C. §16 0 2.	 The Act specifically recognizes "the
fundamental need to protect, and where appropriate,
improve the quality of soil, water, and air resources."
Id. at §1602(5)(c). It also provides for consideration
of "the economic and environmental aspects of various
systems of renewable resource managements, including
the related systems of silviculture and protection of
forest resources, to provide for outdoor recreation
(includilng wilderness), range, timber, watershed,
wildlife, and fish." Id. at §1604 (g)(3)(A). These
provisions indicate that the planning process must
include consideration of environmental values that the
Forest Service has not always regarded equally
with its traditional missions of timber
harvesting, grazing and mineral exploration. The plans
will set the management direction of the national
forests for a least the next ten years. See generall/
Wilkinson & Anderson, Land and Resource Pririnirtirthe
National Forests, 64 Ore. L. Rev. 1 (1985).
NFMA requires the Forest Service to coordinate its
planning process with other federal agencies. 	 16
U.S.C. §1604(a); 36 CFR 219.7. Public participation
is also contemplated. Id. at §1604(d). This provides
the Park Service and nark protection advocates with an
opportunity to comment on and influence forest plans.
Forest plans that ignore adjacent park lands or
overlook park values by providing for inconsistent
resource deveopment on park borders might he subject to
appeal on the grounds that they violate statutory
intent to achieve a relatively harmonious land use
pattern between forest and neighboring lands. See 16
U.S.C. §1604 (a); 36 CFR 219.1 (h)(3) (Forest Service
is to recognize forest lands as ecosystems); 36 CFR
219.1 (h)(9) (Forest Service is to coordinate with
others). But the Forest Service has adopted the policy
that buffer zones are inappropriate next to designated
wilderness areas; adjacent lands are thus open to
multiple use activities. Since we do not yet have any
court decisions reviewing final forest plans, we don't
know what substantive requirements the courts might
impose on the Forest Service res pecting the treatment
of forest lands adjacent to national parks.
C.	 Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C.
§1701-1784.
FLPMA endorses multiple use management for BLM
lands, 43 U.S.C. §1 732 (a) , and provides that
environmental values should he taken into account in
management decisions. 	 43 U.S.C. §1701(a)(8), §1702(c),
§1711(a), §1732(h).	 FLPMA also creates a planning
process which provides for the RLM to coordinate its
planning with other public agencies. 	 Id. at
§1712(c)(9).	 The Act anticipates broad public
participation and judicial review.	 Id. at §170l(a)(5),
§1701(a)(6), §1702(d). Furthermore, the Act mandates
that the BLM review its roadless lands for possible
wilderness designation. Id. at §1782. Thus, as in the
case of NFMA, the Park Service and park protection
advocates may take advantage of the FLPMA planning and
participation provisions to influence BLM decisions
respectin g public lands adjacent to the national parks.
See general 1 ,2 Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland
Management IV: FLPMA, PRIA, and the Multiple Use
Mandate, 14 Envtl. Law 1 (1983).
IV. Federal Resource Protection Legislation
A. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §1531-1543.
Parks that are bordered by public lands which
provide habitat for endangered or threatened species
listed under the ESA derive some protection from the
Act. Adjacent federal land management agencies
contemplating any action that might effect the listed
species are required to consult with the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) to insure that their actions are
"not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
any endangered species or threatened s pecies or result
in the destruction or adverse modification of
(critical) habitat of such species." 16 P.S.C.
§1536(a)(2). Usually the consultation process is
integrated into the NEPA analysis. A FWS jeopardy
opinion blocks the project until the initiating agency
redesigns it and can demonstrate "no jennardy."
The ESA can he enforced by a citizen suit, thus
any interested individual or organization can sue to
insure compliance with the statute. Parks with
migratory wildli:, populations which include a listed
species that ut—izes adjacent public lands will
therefore be the direct beneficiary of a FWS jeopardy
opinion or a successful citizen suit. 	  The North
Fork Road controversy on Glacier National Park's
western border; Conner v. Burford, supra. See Professor
Coggin's materials for additional information on the
ESA and relevant cases.
B. Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §1131-1136.
Parks that are bordered by designated wilderness
areas are provided maximum protection against
threatening development activities since wilderness
lands must he preserved in their natural state under
the Wilderness Act. An important park protection
strategy, therefore, is pursuing legislation to
designate adjacent Forest Service or BLM lands as
wilderness. The opportunity to promote additional
wilderness designation is afforded under NFMA, 16
U.S.C. §1604(e)(1), and at least one court has ruled
that the Forest Service must specifically review all
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roadless lands for their wilderness potential.
California v. Block, 690 F. 2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982).
rie also FLPMA, TrJ.S.C. §1782. While this presented
a golden opportunity for the Park Service to address
publicly the question of whether undeveloped public
lands adjoining the parks should he designated As
wilderness, it does not appear to have done so--
perhaps, out of deference to the prerogatives of
neighboring land management agencies.
C. Wild & Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §1271-1287
Parks bordered by classified rivers under the Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act will receive some protection
from the Act. The Act provides that each component of
the national wild and scenic rivers system is to he
administered "to protect and enhance the values which
caused it to be included in said system." 16 U.S.C.
§1281(0. The Act limits development activity in the
river corridor to minimize the possibility of harm to
the river or the immediately surrounding lands. The
Act specifically provides that the agency responsible
for managing the river must carefully regulate timber
harvesting, road construction and mining activities
near the designated river. 16 U.S.C. §1283(a),
§1280(a).
Because inclusion of rivers bordering national
parks in the Wild and Scenic Rivers System will protect
the lands immediately surrounding the rivers, it would
make sense for the Park Service to partici pate actively
in the legislative designation process. Where the Park
Service already shares management responsibility for
classified river with another agency, the Park Service
has a unique opportunity to promote park values with a
view toward influencing management decisions beyond the
immediate river corridor. See e.g., The North Fork of
the Flathead River where Glacier National Park and the
Flathead National Forest share management
responsibility for the river.
D. National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §470-
470t.
The NHPA provides for the establishment of a list
of historic properties titled the National Register of
Historic Places. Whenever a federal agency undertakes
a project that may affect a designated historic
property, it must consider the effect of its actions on
that pro perty and attem p t to minimize harm to it. 16
U.S.C. at §400f, §470h-2(f). The historic properties
included in the national park system should therefnre
receive some protection under the Act.
E. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §1857-1857L.
The Clean Air Act provides the national parks with
protection against deterioration in their air quality.
The Act classifies national parks as Class I air sheds
and mandates special protection to guard their air
quality and insure that visibility standards are met.
42 U.S.C. §7472(a), §7492. The Act covers public and
private pollution sources, thus air pollution that
arises on public lands and threatens park air quality
is regulated and subject to challen ge under the
statute. More detailed information on air quality
issues should he available from the materials prepared
by Ms. Molly Ross.
F. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §1251-1376.
Park water quality is protected by the Clean Water
Act which establishes general water quality standards
and limits the discharge of effluents into the nation's
waterways. The Act applies to public agencies; thus,
land management agencies responsible for public lands
adjacent to national parks must observe the Act's water
quality standards. This means, for example, that the
Forest Service is responsible for regulating commercial
activities such as timber harvesting to assure
compliance with the Act. Similarly, the Forest Service
must conduct its own activities, such as road
construction projects, to comply with the Act.
Since park water quality is usually desi gnated at
the highest standard, the Act imposes significant
responsibilities on adjacent landowners or managers.
To the extent that adjacent land management agencies
meet their responsibilities under the Act, the parks
are assured that waters they share with these agencies
are protected. To the extent that these agencies do
not meet their responsibilities, they are subject to
enforcement proceedings and suit by interested
individuals or organizations.
V. Federal Resource Management Statutes
A variety of federal resource management statutes
may have some limited application to the park
protection issue, either by establishing standards that
a public agency responsible for managing the resource
must meet or by implementing procedures that must be
met before development projects proceed. The statutes
are too many and varied to discuss here usefully. They
include: the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1201-1328; the Geothermal Steam Act,
30 U.S.C. § 1001-1025; tne Mining Law of 1872, 30
U.S.C. §21-77; the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30
U.S.C.	 l8l -287 ;etc.
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VI. Federal Common Law
A. Nuisance Doctrine
It has been argued that the common law doctrine of
public nuisance might he available to protect the
national parks against harmful external activities, and
that the appropriate public nuisance doctrine is one
formulated under the federal common law. See United
States v. County Board of Arlington County, 487 F.
tgTh:77177 (F.D. Vi7-7-977). —However, the Supreme
Court's second decision in Illinois v. Cit2 of
Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 304 (19817, hords that where
congress has adopted legislation regulating an area
(water pollution in this case), common law nuisance
remedies will no longer he available because Congress
has preempted the field.	 See Illinois v. City of
— — —Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972)7Fordrng that a federaT
comM717—riw remedy may he fashioned where overriding,
federal interests are present). In the aftermath of
the second Milwaukee decision, it is likely that the
courts wilr orriTy recognize a common law remedy if
Congress has not legislated in the area. In the case
of the national parks, this At least leaves open the
possibility of asserting a public nuisance claim
against aesthetic and noise intrusions.
The Park Service may therefore assert such claims
in litigation against private entities presenting
visual or auditory threats to a park, and A forceful
argument can he made that the appropriate law to apply
would be the federal common law. But see United States
v. County Board of Arlington Counti, supra. But if is
not likely that the Park Service wilTritigate such
claims against another public agency. If this type of
threatening activity arises on public lands adjacent to
a park, the only realistic plaintiff is a private party
who would seek to assert the park's interests. This
raises a threshold question of standing. However, if
the plaintiff can establish standing, it seems clear
that the appropriate law to apply, in the absence of a
controlling statute, would be the federal common law of
nuisance since the primary interests at stake would he
federal ones
B. Public Trust Doctrine
It has also been argued that the public trust
doctrine might provide the parks with legal protection
that they may not otherwise have under existing
statutes. Although one court initially relied upon a
public trust argument to protect Redwood National Park
against nearby logging activities harmful to the park's
watershed, Sierra Club v. Dept. of Interior, 376 F.
1 0
Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974), the same court virtually
ignored the public trust claim in its later opinions in
the same case. See 398 F. Supp. 284, and 424 F. SUPP•
172. SubsequenTry, Another district court held that
any public trust responsibilities the Secretary of the
Interior owed to the national parks were identical to
his statutory res ponsibilities under the Organic Act,
and the court refused to recognize a distinguishable
public trust duty. This precedent respecting the
national parks, as well as the historical underpinnings
of the public trust doctrine, suggests that it does not
hold much promise as a viable legal tool to use in
arguing for park protection. See general 11 Sax, The
Puh 1 i c Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Lew
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471
(1970); Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public
Land Law, 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 269 (1980).
VII. Adjacent State Lands
Several of the federal statutes cited shove,
particularly those protecting resources or regulating
Pollution, would apply to activities occurring on state
lands adjacent to national parks and might he relied
upon to protect parks against threatening Activities.
Otherwise park protection will depend upon state law.
Several states have adopted environmental protection
statutes similar tn NEPA which require state agencies
to review the environmental consequences of their
Actions. 15_e_ti e.g., Mont. Code Ann. §75-1-101 et.
seq., (1983).--A few states have adopted more rigorous
environmental rights statutes. See e.g., Mich. StAt.
Ann. § 14	 6-m.528 (201) (Callaghan 19E	 Some state land
use planning statutes, particularly those providing
for "areas of critical concern", might require state
and local planning officials to consider nearby
national parks. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. §9 - 8 - 202
(1985). The Park Service and park protection advocates
can look to this type of le g islation to challenge
externally threatening activities originating on state
lands adjacent to a national park. Because this
legislation varies noticeably state by state, it is
impossible to cover it here. See generally Keiter, On
Protecting the National Parks From the External Threats
Dilemma, 20 Land & Water L. Rev. 355, 391-393 (1985);
Comment, State Participation in Federal Policy Making
for the Yellowstone Ecosystem: A Meaningful Solution or
Business as Usual?, 21 Land & Water L. Rev. 397 (1986).
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